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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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ARMY review completed.

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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CONFIDENTIAL**REPORT**

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Unit Designations

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2. The only equipment in either unit that carried the unit designations were the unit standards.

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However, it was a common practice among soldiers to mark equipment, such as caps, spoons, and belts, with the unit numerical designation, contrary to standing orders that such information was secret.

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Security Duties

4.

part of the guard duty included guarding an unidentified Soviet Army water pumping station about 15 km from [redacted] garrison at Goetzendorf (N 48-01, E 16-35), Austria. This pump station always had one sentry on duty and was under the supervision of an Austrian civilian [redacted]

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Required Identification

5.

In theory, EM needed their service book and a copy of orders directing them into the area to enter a military compound. For officers, only their identification book was required.

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The identification described above was required by officers and EM to enter other military areas and maneuver areas in Austria.

Foreign Nationals

6.

[redacted] the security of the Military Community of Goetzendorf was very lax. It was not unusual to see Austrians who had business with the unit come into the community area, and there was no fence or any other type of enclosure around the installation. Further, the lack of security and easy access to the units was a sore point with the political officers. Austrians had been known to enter the battalion headquarters building and, on these occasions, no individual had the right to detain them but the staff duty officer who was called and asked them to leave. 2

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7.

There were two types of Austrian civilians who were in the employ of the 55th Separate Tk Tng Bn: the regular employees who worked each day and the temporary employees. All of these persons were hired through the Battalion Deputy Commander for the Housekeeping Section, Major MAYNKO (fnu), who was responsible for battalion supply and utilities. Clearance was obtained for the Austrian help through Sr. Lt Vladimir Ivanovich ZHUKOV who was an osobnyak (counterintelligence officer) in the unidentified mortar regiment that was stationed in the camp.

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8.

Regular Austrian employees who worked each day [redacted] consisted of the following: a girl named "Annushka" who sold beer, wine, canned goods, chocolate, candy, and pastries to officers and their dependents in the mess of battalion officers' communal dwelling and two cleaning women, from Mannersdorf (N 47-58, E 16-36), who cleaned the officers' communal dwelling building in the 55th Separate Tk Tng Bn every day but Sundays from 0600 to 1400 hours; all other buildings were cleaned by the soldiers. These women came in a group with other Austrian employees by bus from Mannersdorf and entered the camp on a foot path from the highway.

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Other employees also came from Mannersdorf and worked at the Auto School Quarters as cleaning women. Temporary employees consisted of persons on contract, such as chimney sweeps and carpenters, but

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Soviet Army Military Intelligence Activities

a. Counterintelligence

10.

[redacted] intelligence personnel [redacted]
[redacted] was Sr Lt Vladimir Ivanovich ZHUKOV. [redacted]

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11. Sr Lt ZHUKOV wore an artillery officer's uniform; his office was located in an attic room of the club building of the unidentified mortar regiment [redacted]. There was another room in the attic of the battalion headquarters of the 55th Separate Tk Tng Bn that was also reputed to belong to this officer. [redacted] the attic room in the mortar regiment had a sign on the door which said "Chemical Laboratory" and [redacted] the door to ZHUKOV's alleged room in the 55th Separate Tk Tng Bn was unmarked and was always locked. [redacted] this officer was directly subordinate to the Chief of Special Section, 13th Gds Mecz Div, and was responsible to no one in the garrison at Goetzendorf. [redacted]

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[redacted] this officer had no known subordinates in the garrison and worked directly with officer secretaries of the Komsomol organization in each unit.

12. At one time [redacted]

[redacted] ZHUKOV came in and asked the battalion Komsomol secretary, Lt Aleksandr Mikhailovich KOZLOV, if everything was in order. The lieutenant replied in the affirmative and added that only one man, Pvt. DAROV (fnu), had been found drunk in Mannersdorf.

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13. On several occasions late in the evening, [redacted] Lt ZHUKOV in civilian clothes riding a bicycle back to garrison from the direction of Mannersdorf) [redacted]

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14.

[redacted] ZHUKOV leaving an Austrian home in Mannersdorf. The rumor in the 55th Separate Tk Tng Bn was that this officer had a net of local civilian informers to spy on Soviet military personnel who had the occasion to go into town.

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15. [redacted] ZHUKOV could override the wishes of the battalion CO [redacted] in some respects. As an example, at one time Austrian civilian women were used to clean the battalion headquarters building. The Special Section officer ordered the Battalion CO to cease this practice and to have soldiers do the cleaning. On another occasion, he was known to have interfered with the punishment of a soldier who was charged with being absent from duty. The soldier was not punished although he later admitted [redacted] that he had been sleeping in the projection booth in the battalion theater. Officers had, on occasions, mentioned ZHUKOV to one another [redacted] referring to him as the most powerful man in the garrison.

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16. From spring 1953 until fall of the same year, [] battalion had an osebnyak of its own, Capt FEDUROV (fnu). This officer also wore an artillery officer's uniform [] FEDUROV had come to the unit from the 15th Gds Med Tk Regt and, upon leaving, was assigned to the 44th Gds Mecz Regt.

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[] this captain was often absent up to two or three weeks at a time.

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this officer often called individual soldiers of the battalion staff into a conference. He interrogated them on relatives and conditions at home and asked such leading questions as, "You are truly happy serving in the great and glorious Soviet Army, aren't you?"

b. Unit Security

17. Although there was no censorship of outgoing mail within [] unit [] the Special Section Officer of the garrison, Lt ZHUKOV, issued instructions to [] to hold letters written by certain individuals to certain specific addresses, only if these were mailed.

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18. There were specific instructions on what was forbidden to be sent through the unit mail in a directive of the Supreme Soviet, dated 1949. These forbidden subjects were the location of units, names of commanders, strength figures, listings of equipment, and photographs of military installations and equipment. The information on these instructions was given to new arrivals [] by platoon commanders.

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19. [] there were instances when mail that contained forbidden information had been intercepted. The writers of the letters were not identified but the letters themselves were read to an assembled battery formation by the zampolit, Capt MURAVYEV (fnu) as an object lesson. The first letter explained to a soldier's mother in detail how she could reach her son's unit. The second letter complained that the writer was being mistreated by his squad sergeant.

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20. Although there were no rules against camera ownership [] all personnel knew that they were forbidden to photograph military equipment or installations. Film exposed by military personnel was developed in an illegal photo laboratory located in the training-aid section and operated by the three battalion training-aid men (laboranti). Although the battalion CO was probably aware of this photo laboratory, he took pains not to notice it.

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21. [] the minimum penalty for violating censorship regulations was five years at hard labor.

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22. The Secret Documents Section [] was part of the Battalion Headquarters. In it were safeguarded all published classified orders, classified manuals, secret instructions, and maps. This section was subordinate to the Battalion C/S.

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MVD Activities

24. [redacted] never [redacted] any evidence of MVD personnel in the Soviet Zone of Austria. [redacted]

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tour of duty was four years and [redacted] their ages differed in no way from the personnel in the Soviet Army. [redacted]

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MVD personnel could arrest Soviet servicemen in the USSR but this was handled strictly by komendatura patrols in the occupation zones. 6

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Case of Security Consciousness

25. [redacted]

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[redacted] in spring 1952, an unusual event occurred during a tank tactics training session; [redacted] indicative of the security-conscious Soviet military mind. The training session was progressing on the banks of the Leitha River close to the garrison area [redacted]. The entire first platoon was following behind a unit tank and was operating as infantry. At one point in the training session, the tank nearly bogged down in the soft soil on the bank of the river and all personnel worked to extricate it. Not too far away, someone in the platoon noticed a brilliant red spot. The tank commander, Jr Sgt Ragim Ibragimovich SABITOV of the Tank Supply Co, then ordered all personnel to advance to the red spot and drove his tank to the site at full speed. Upon arrival at the site, they saw a red parachute and the fragments of a balloon. In the middle of the debris was an object which looked like a radio set. The junior sergeant warned all men that this might be a bomb and to stay away from it.

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[redacted] The junior sergeant then told all the men that this set was undoubtedly meant for spies or saboteurs who were in the vicinity and ordered most of the men to start beating the bushes along the river to locate these spies. Two of the men were dispatched to the battalion to report the find.

26. After assuring himself that the "spies" were not then in the area, the junior sergeant placed the men in strategic positions to catch them when they arrived. This position was maintained by platoon guards in a secret watch for 48 hours. Finally, the battalion CO decided that the "spies" were not coming and put the junior sergeant in the guard house for a week because he had not used his head in bringing up the tank; the battalion CO claimed it was the tank's tracks on the river bank that had warned the "spies". After the watch was relieved, the radio set and the parachute were picked up and brought to the battalion where an English-speaking officer laboriously translated the printing on the set. [redacted] the balloon was a meteorological balloon [redacted] the

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Security for New Weapons 3

27. A new Soviet carbine, the 7.62 mm SKS semi-automatic model, and a new Soviet 7.62 mm SMG arrived [redacted] At that time they had only been issued to the 1st Training Company of the battalion. The weapons were kept in a locked room on the first floor of the barracks of the 1st Tng Co. [redacted] the key to the room was kept by the company first sergeant who was responsible for the safeguarding and issue of these weapons.

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28. Each weapon [redacted] had a metal tag bearing the serial number of the weapon. The tags for the carbines had the Cyrillic letters "KP" indicating carbine (karabin) and the tags for the SMGs had the Cyrillic letters "ABT" indicating a submachine gun (avtomat). These tags were issued to each soldier who was assigned a weapon. In order to draw his weapon, the soldier had to turn in the tag to the first sergeant who issued him the weapon with the corresponding number. When the weapon was returned, the soldier was given back his tag and was expected to keep it on his person at all times. In addition, the first sergeant maintained a master roster in his office of all the men in the company and the serial numbers of their respective weapons.

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29. Manuals dealing with the ballistics and nomenclature of the two weapons were kept in the Secret Documents Section of the battalion headquarters building. This section was located on the second floor of this building in a room with barred windows and a 24-hour guard in the corridor. During duty hours, the guard did not stop any one from entering or leaving this room. [redacted] after duty hours there was a control over traffic to the room [redacted]

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The manuals were located in a large wooden cabinet against the wall opposite the door to the room. The cabinet had two doors and was kept locked with a large padlock during off-duty hours. The key to this cabinet was kept by Sgt Vladimir Ivanovich BUCHNEV who was the Secret Documents Clerk (Sekretchik).

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Informers

30. Once having taken the oath of service in the Soviet Army, EM could not, in theory, withhold any information from a superior officer. On this precept, the informer system of the Soviet Army is founded. Most EM who are reluctant to inform on their comrades are generally threatened with a trial for not fulfilling their oath of service. They are informed that it is their duty as military personnel of the Soviet Army to inform on any violators that come within their ken.

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